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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
JOHN "\V. NIELSEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 7203 
GLEN MAUCHLEY, 
Defenda;nt and Respondent. 
Appeal from the District Court of the 
First Judicial District, in and for 
Cache County, State of Utah. 
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT 
Respondent agrees with statement in Appellant's 
brief relating to the proceedings out of which this appeal 
has arisen. Similarly, except for palpable typographical 
errors, respondent agrees with appellant's summary of 
the complaint and answer. 
Respondent disagrees in some particulars with ap-
pellant's summary of the facts. The general facts as 
to time, the locality where the accident occurred and the 
icy condition of the road are not in dispute. As to what 
the record shows hearing upon how the accident hap-
pened and the position of the two vehicles with respect 
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4 
to each other, the parties are not in accord, hence this 
additional statement. Appellant in his brief, has desig-
nated himself as plaintiff and respondent as defendant. 
Those designations, accordingly, will be continued in 
this brief. 
FACTS 
Plaintiff admits that as he approached defendant's 
dwelling house from the west on the College Ward-~1ill­
ville Road, in Cache County, Utah, and when he was 300 
feet west of the driveway to said house he saw defend-
ant's bus emerge from beside the east of defendant's 
house and come into view, backing out beyond the south 
wall of said house toward the road (Tr. 92). Both ve-
hicles continued on and while plaintiff traveled a di~­
tance of fifty-seven feet (Tr. 93) defendant's bus trav-
eled, without stopping, from the house to the fence, then 
twenty-four feet (Tr. 94) across the roadway to the 
edge of the north shoulder (Tr. 96, 97). Then it "went 
right out onto the road" and "clear across it." (Tr. 97). 
The transcript of the evidence shows the following 
in the plaintiff's testimony (Tr. 96): 
'' Q. All right, then, where was the rear end of his 
bus when you were on the culvert~ 
A. The rear end of his bus was, I'd say, just 
about out to the shoulder. The back end of 
the bus. 
Q. Now you say the back end of the bus \Yas 
about out to the shoulder~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. When you were on top of the culvert~ 
A. Yes. 
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Q. X ow is that your testimony 
A. :Jf y tP8timony, yes.'' 
Again the plaintiff testified as follows (T.r. 97) : 
'' Q. But when you were on top of the culvert the 
back end of his bus was about even with the 
north shoulder 
A. I'd say yes. 
Q. There's no doubt about that, is there~ 
A. I don't think so.'' 
Neither vehicle stopped and they were at that mo-
ment about 243 feet apart. Plaintiff then was apprehen-
sive and looked down at his speedometer ''to see just 
about what speed my car was running at that point, 
because I realized what was going to happen.'' (Tr. 92). 
Plaintiff had been aware of the movement of de-
fendant's bus while he traversed the fifty-seven feet, 
had come up on.to the top of the culvert and had reduced 
his speed from about 25 miles per hour to about 20 miles 
per hour (Tr. 65). 
There was six feet of shoulder and thirty-three feet 
more spac~ to the fence on his right to the south beyond 
the shoulder, (Tr. 88), thirty-nine feet all told, yet plain-
tiff continued on, covered the intervening distance, turned 
north to his left across the center of the road and collided 
with the bus, the left front wheel and fender of plaintiff's 
automobile making contact with the left side of the bus 
"Right in front of his left rear wheel" (Tr. 99). The 
left rear wheel of the bus was two feet north of the 
center line (Tr. 99). The bus was at approximately 45° 
angle with the highway, facing northwest (Tr. 100). 
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After being warned of the danger, realizing what 
was going to happen, plaintiff continued on approxi-
mately 120 feet, one half the distance between the culvert 
and defendant's driveway, without doing anything to 
avert the impending collision. Then, he tried to stop-
" and it couldn't be done." ( Tr. 66). 
At the close of the evidence, defendant moved for 
a directed verdict charging plaintiff with negligence and 
carelessness proximately resulting in the accident and 
injuries complained of. 
In ruling on that motion the court said : 
''In considering this motion the Court must 
take into consideration the testimony, which seems 
too clear to be controverted, and in ruling on this 
question I'm going to consider the testimony of 
the plaintiff only without considering the testi-
mony of the defendant. It is presumed that the 
testimony of the plaintiff is given in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, and on that pre-
sumption the Court must look at the testimony." 
(Tr. 171) 
Thereupon the motion was granted. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant agrees with the principle advanced by 
plaintiff that in determining whether the evidence justi-
fied the ruling for the directed verdict the appellate 
court must take the view of the evidence most favorable 
to the plaintiff. And judging from the number of cases 
cited by plaintiff bearing upon that point, one might 
think that the predominant sin of trial courts in the 
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granting of directed verdicts is failure to view the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the party resisting 
the motion. Close study of the cited cases, however, 
~hmYs that in most instances special rules were ignorecl 
which accounts for the failure to view the evidence in 
its most favorable light. The motion for a directed 
verdict has been likened to a demurrer to the evidence 
and as said by this court in reversing the trial court in 
one case where a motion for directed verdict had been 
denied. 
"There are other conflicts between the plain-
tiff's testimony and that of defendant, but we 
need not consider these conflicts in the evidence 
in passing upon the questions now under review. 
In deciding the questions whether or not a non-
suit should have been granted or a verdict di-
rected for the defendant, we must view the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 
In testing the sufficiency of the evidence with 
respect to these questions the defendant stands 
in the position of admitting- the truth of plaintiff's 
evidence, and all reasonable inferences which the 
jury might fairly draw therefrom favorable to 
the plaintiff.'' Elswood vs. Oregon Short Line, 
82 Utah 235, 23 P. (2nd) 925. 
That comment specifically referring to conflicts be-
tween plaintiff's testimony and that of defendant, with 
defendant's motion for a directed verdict to be decided, 
illustrates a frequent error of trial courts, which is, 
allowing themselves to be influenced by defendant's testi-
mony. Doing S'O amounts to an invasion by the court of 
the province and function of the jury. Of the cases cited 
in plaintiff's brief in that class are, Roach vs. Railroad 
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Co., 69 Utah 530, 256 Pac. 1061, Ricks vs. Budge, 91 Utah 
307, 64 Pac. (2nd) 208, and Lee vs. New York Life Insur-
ance Co., 95 Utah 445, 82 Pac. (2nd) 178. 
In Uhr vs. Eaton, 95 Utah 309, 80 P. (2nd) 925, also 
cited by plaintiff, the trial court held the defendant 
immune to damages in a slander case because she had 
been consistent in her statements in the initial interview 
with the prosecutor and at the preliminary hearing. The 
court did not give effect to the rule that bad faith or 
falsity destroys the immunity, and that evidence of 
falsity in the damage c:1se ~hould be pass·ed np0n hy the 
jury. 
In Graham vs. Johnson, 109 Utah 346, 166 Pac. 
(2nd) 230 (modified on motion for rehearing), the court 
ruled out plaintiff's claim to recovery because he was 
clearly negligent, failing to recognize that, ''the so-
called humanitarian doctrine of last clear chance applies'' 
to nullify the effect of that neglect. 
In Groesbeck vs. Lakeside Printing Co., 55 Utah 335, 
186, Pac. 103, it was failure to give importance to the 
position of plaintiff, an employee of tender years, injured 
while subject to the mechanical hazards of a printing 
press, that accounted for the reversal of the trial court. 
Where as here, however, depending upon the testi-
mony of the plaintiff alone for the facts, we think the 
court was not obliged to sift somewhat contradictory 
statements of plaintiff himself and take only those which 
would make up an unreasonable account of what took 
place. It is presumed, as Judge Morrison said that the 
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plaintiff's own testimony states the most favorable view 
of the plaintiff's case. And of the plaintiff's own testi-
mony where there are conflicts, he could believe that 
least favorable to the plaintiff. 
This court, on that point, has said in a case where 
plaintiff had sued for damages, alleging negligence of 
defendant and had himself testified as to the conditions 
constituting such negligence, in reversing the trial court 
for refusing to grant a non-suit because of contributory 
negligence : 
"The plaintiff's knowledge of the dangerous 
place at the time of the accident is shown by his 
own testimony. In such a case ·where a non-suit 
is asked, the trial court may consider such testi-
mony true as bears the most strongly against the 
interest of the plaintiff.'' Fowler vs. Pleasant 
Valley Coal Co., 16 Utah 384, 52 P. 594. 
To the same effect is Putnam vs. Industrial Commis-
sion, 80 Utah 187, 14 P. (2nd) 973, where this court said 
in reviewing an award of the Industrial Commission. 
"In considering the testimony of the applicant 
on the issue as to whose employ he was in, we 
must look, not alone to the answers made by hiln 
to leading questions, or an assumption that he 
was in the employ of Putnam, but to the whole of 
the testimony bearing on the subject. As to that, 
the familiar rule is applicable that testimony of 
a witness on his direct examination is no stronger 
than as modified or left by his further examina-
tion or by his cross-examination. A particular 
part of his testimony may not be singled out to 
the exclusion of another part of equal importance 
bearing on the subject.'' 
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Accordingly, while the view of the evidence adopted 
by the trial court may not be as favorable as plaintiff, 
would like it to be, yet tested by the rules of evidence 
enunciated above, it is what the trial court had a right 
to take as the plaintiff's case. And shielded from the 
diluting effect which consideration of defendant's evi-
dence would have had upon it, it becomes "the view 
most favorable to the plaintiff'' which the appellate 
court should consider in passing upon this appeal. 
Another principle which this court will take notice 
of in reaching its conclusion is that the judgment of the 
trial court is presumed to be correct. 
''Every presumption must be indulged on ap-
peal in favor of correctness of judgment below 
and hence in absence of anything in the record to 
the contrary, \Ye must presume that the court was 
right in directing judgment for the defendant." 
Hutchinson vs. Smart, 51 Ut. 172, 169 P. 166. 
Plaintiff seems to misconstrue just what the judg-
ment is. In Appellant's Brief, page 6, this reference is 
made: 
"The court held that in-as-much as the plain-
tiff was travelling 25 miles an hour when 300 feet 
from the point he was contributory negligent as 
a matter of law." 
The trial court actually said : 
"Here this accident occurred on an early 
winter morning at 7 :40 when it is admitted that 
the roads were icy and slick. Mr. Nielsen has 
testified that as he crossed the culvert, which is 
approximately 250 feet on his testimony,-that 
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he obselTed that school bus backing out; that he 
was apprehensive that there might be an accident, 
and he looked at his speedometer and ascertained 
that he was going t\Yenty-five miles an hour. Yet 
in view of that warning which he had, or that 
apprehension which he had 250 feet down the 
road, he continued on until the accident occurred.'' 
(Tr. 171). 
From this it is clear that the court determined upon 
two acts of. negligence by plaintiff: 
1. ''Yet in view of the warning which he had, 
or that apprehension which he had 250 feet down 
the road, he continued until the accident oc-
curred." (Tr. 171). 
2. "The law also requires a person driving 
upon the highway to have sufficient control of 
his automobile that he can handle it in cases of 
emergency, that he is not to drive his automobile 
at a rate which is-or a speed which is excessive 
in view of the time of day, the visibility on the 
highway, and the weather conditions. The con-
ditions being such as they were, a speed of twenty-
five miles an hour, if that ·were the speed upon 
that highway, when the testimony tends to show 
that an accident 250 feet lower down the road 
could not be avoided without skidding and svYerY-
ing and striking the car, it seems to me that the 
testimony that has been given is sufficiently clear 
and compelling that the Court must find as a 
matter of law that the plaintiff was negligent in 
the operation of his automobile and that his negli-
gence, if not the cause of, contributed to the in-
juries which he received." (Tr. 171, 172). 
Plaintiff seems to argue also that the trial court 
erred by finding that defendant was not negligent. 
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Otherwise we fail to understand the applicability of the 
cases cited on pages 10 and 11 of Appellant's brief. 
The court said respecting defendant (Tr. 172): 
'' . . . Now in this particular instance the 
defendant may have been negligent, he may have 
been culpably negligent, yet I feel that the testi-
mony shows that the plaintiff was also negligent, 
which negligence contributed to his injury, and 
the Court in the circumstances must direct a 
verdict in favor of the defendant and against the 
plaintiff 'no cause of action'." 
Under the circumstances of this case, it is elemental 
that if plaintiff were negligent and such negligence con-
tributed to or was the proximate cause of the accident 
and injuries he cannot recover from defendant regard-
less of any classification of defendant with respect to 
negligence. Accordingly, we shall answer plaintiff's 
argument concerning right of way, wholly as it relates 
to plaintiff's own negligence. 
In the Minnesota case, Salters vs. Uhler, 292 N. \V. 
762, cited by plaintiff at page 8 of his brief, the Supreme 
Court said: 
"Until a reasonable ground appeared to make 
plaintiff appreciate that defendant was going to 
enter the highway irrespective of plaintiff's pres-
nee, he had a right to assume that due care would 
be exercised. '' 
And then concluded apparently that there was no such 
reasonable ground shown in the evidence, as the trial 
court was reversed for granting defendant's motion for 
a directed verdict. 
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In contrast to that, the facts in our case, as herein-
before set out, show that when this plaintiff was on top 
of the culvert 243 feet away, he knew that an accident 
would happen. Defendant was then driving onto the 
north shoulder and continued onto the hard surface. In 
face of all of that, plaintiff kept on from the culvert to 
half way to defendant's driveway, (about 120 feet) 
before he did anything about it, before he tried to stop 
''and then it couldn't be done.'' Even under the require-
ment of the Salters case, this plaintiff knew when he was 
243 feet away, that defendant was entering onto the 
shoulder of the road, that he had only six feet of shoulder, 
and then the hard surface, and that he did not stop. 
There was no need for a ''jury to decide whether plain-
tiff apprehended the risk seasonably," as there was in 
the Salters case. He ''knew ·what '\Yas goint; to ha.pJ1en, '~ 
and admits traveling about 120 feet before doing any-
thing to prevent it. There is no conflict between plain-
tiff and defendant in that evidence to require the func-
tioning of a jury . .And as reasonable minds would all 
agree that failure to act while traveling even twenty 
feet or fifty feet, coming closer all the time to tragedy, 
would be unwise, all would certainly agree that to con-
tinue on for 120 feet at 20 miles per hour would be fool-
hardy and careless beyond excuse. Certainly then, on 
the two grounds, it was negligence as a matter of law. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court in allowing plaintiff 
Salter such a favorable position with respect to the right 
of way statute, supports what has been called the '' abso-
lute" right of way rule. That rule, however, does not 
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represent the weight of authority and clearly is not the 
law of this state. 
An annotation in 136 A.L.R. 1497, 1498, shows the 
distinction between conferring an ''absolute'' right of 
way upon the favored vehicles and the "relative" view. 
In that annotation it is said: 
''As pointed out in the earlier annotation (89 
A.L.R. 838) by the weight of authority a 'relative' 
construction is given to statutes confirming rights 
of way. As illustrative of the decisions adhering 
to the 'relative' construction, reference may be 
made to the following cases decided since the 
prior annotation, in which it was expressly held 
that in the application of statutes or ordinances 
giving vehicles approaching from the right, the 
right of way, priority of time in approaching an 
intersection and distance are important factors 
and that the statutes do not give an 'absolute' 
privilege to the vehicle approaching from the 
right.'' 
This court has had occasion recently to review the 
obligations of drivers who dispute the meaning of right 
of way and to declare that such right is not ''absolute'' 
but "relative." Listed with the cases in 136 A.L.R. 1497. 
1498~ supra, is a Utah case prominent a f~e:w years ago 
and referred to with approval by the recent decisions of 
this court which have considered the right of way rule, 
Bullock vs. Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 Pacific (2nd) 350. 
There this court reversed the trial court fo1· failure to 
grant defendant's motion for a directed verdict and said: 
"He who has the right of way may assume 
that the driver on the left will afford him that 
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right. . .. But his rights are only relative .. u 
The circumstances may be such, that by his own 
conduct, he who ha8 the apparent right of way 
has lost the benefit of that right; or the circum-
stances may be surh that for him to insist that 
this position on the right entitled him to proceed 
first through the intersection would be careless-
ness and negligence upon his part. The possessor 
of the right of way is not relieved of the necessity 
of exercising care simply because he is the driver 
on the right." 
Justice \Volfe in his concurring opinion explained 
why this court adopted the ''relative'' rather than the 
''absolute'' view in these words, ''This ruling encour-
ages both the drivers to be careful." 
In the case of Hickok vs. Skinner, ____ Utah ______ , 190 
Pacific (2nd) 514 in affirming the rule of the Bullock 
case this court said : 
''Regardless of which driver is technically en-
titled to the right of way, both operators must 
use due care and caution in proceeding into and 
across intersections. While the burden to drive 
so carefully as always to be prepared for, and to 
be able to avoid, the negligence of another should 
not be placed on either driver, there should be 
placed on both the burden to keep a proper look-
out and to use reasonable care to avoid a colli-
sion. Neither should be permitted to close his 
eyes to other vehicles which he knows or has 
reason to believe are approaching, simply because 
a state statute or municipal ordinance designates 
him the preferred driver. The rights of drivers 
approaching and crossing intersections are rela-
tive. Both drivers have the duties of being heed-
ful and of maintaining a proper lookout.'' 
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In Conklin vs. Walsh, .... Utah ...... , 193 Pacific (2nd) 
437, this additional comment with respect to right of way 
is made in affirming the action of the trial court which 
directed a verdict for plaintiff on the ground that defend-
ant was negligent as a matter of law: 
''The duty to keep a proper lookout applies 
as well to the favored as to the disfavored driver. 
Neither driver can excuse his failure to observe 
because the other driver failed in his duty. Neither 
driver is at any time to be excused for want of 
vigilance or failure to see what is plain to be 
seen.'' 
Summarizing the facts, this court had said: 
"Defendant's truck driver, knowing there was 
a car approaching from the north, never looked 
again in that direction until it was too late to 
avoid a collision.'' 
It might well say now: 
''The favored driver, knowing that the bus 
was at the edge of the north shoulder, and was 
continuing on across its width of six feet onto 
the pavement, did nothing about it ,,~hile he trav-
eled about 120 feet until it was too late to avoid 
a collision.'' 
The rule set out above would then be applicable to 
our case, as we think it is applicable, and so justify the 
action of the trial court in directing the verdict for de-
fendant. 
It is recognized that our case, strictly speaking is 
not an intersection case except as the highway on which l 
the plaintiff, Nielsen, was driving intersected with de-
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fendant 's drive'lvay. As plaintiff admits in his brief, 
Section 57-7-139 U. C. A. 1943, has not been construed by 
this court. This section had been considered by the Su-
preme Court of the state of California in the year 1930, 
prior to the time it became the law' of this state, in a 
case also cited by plaintiff. The California statute read: 
"The driver of a vehicle entering a public 
highway from a private road or drive shall yield 
the right of way to all vehicles approaching on 
said highway." 
This, except for a few immaterial variations, is identi-
cal with the Utah statute. The California court had 
this to say regarding it: 
''The argument is made that, irrespective of 
the distance between the approaching car driven 
by the defendant, Mary Horn, and the private 
highway on which the truck was emerging, it gave 
the defendant the right of way. The subdivision 
of the section, however, is not susceptible of any 
such interpretation. If interpreted litera1ly as 
the subdivision reads, or as it then read, no one 
could ever drive from a private road upon a public 
highway if any one were approaching upon such 
highway irrespective of the d]st:;~nce. The sub-
division must be construed . to give effect to the 
intent of the legislature which was to prevent 
automobile drivP.rs on private roads from enter-
ing a public highway when a car was approaching 
upon such highway so near as to constitute an 
immediate hazard, and not that no one should 
enter upon a public highway from a private road 
or driveway so long as the public highway was 
in use." Wakefield vs. Horn (Cal.) 293 Pac. 97. 
It is assumed that plaintiff quoted the said section 
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and cited the Salters case to justify the view that plain-
tiff had an absolute right of way. It is submitted that 
the decision of the California court, interpreting the 
private driveway statute, and the decisions of this court 
relative to right of way in intersection cases adequately 
refutes that contention and justified the trial court in 
this case in granting defendant's motion for a directed 
verdict. 
We dispute not plaintiff's statement that contribu-
tory negligence as a matter of law, can properly be 
found by the court only where reasonable minds would 
agree that the party charged with negligence acted in 
an imprudent manner so as to contribute to the accident 
and injuries; nor do we dispute that cases where a court 
will so declare are rare; nor that where· the evidence or 
plaintiff and defendant are in conflict it is the province 
of the jury to find the facts. 
We do contend, however, that neither of those rules 
were violated by the judgment of the trial court in this 
case, that on the contrary the neglect of plaintiff, judged 
from his own testimony alone, was so patent, that as in 
the Bullock vs. Luke case, supra, this court could have 
properly reversed the trial court had it failed to grant 
defendant's motion. 
Defendant accordingly prays that the judgment be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MERRILL C. FAUX 
Attorney for Respondent. 
. 
I 
I 
l 
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